The role of fiscal policies for external imbalances : evidence from the European Union by Afonso, António & Coelho, José Carlos
 





The Role of Fiscal Policies for External Imbalances: Evidence 
from the European Union 
 
António Afonso, José Carlos Coelho 
 
 










REM – Research in Economics and Mathematics 










Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of REM. Short, up to 















REM – Research in Economics and Mathematics 
 




















The Role of Fiscal Policies for External 











We revisit the relation between budget deficits and current account deficits for 28 European 
Union countries from 1996 to 2019. We find that an increase in budget deficit of 1 pp of GDP 
results in a deterioration of the current account deficit of 0.318 pp of GDP, which supports the 
Twin Deficits Hypothesis. On the other hand, dynamic panel estimates partially corroborate the 
Equivalence Ricardian Hypothesis in the presence of a fiscal rules index. In addition: i) the 
relation between the two deficits is asymmetric and the negative impact of the recent Eurozone 
banking and sovereign debt crisis on the current account balance is observed; ii) after 2010, the 
budget balance positively affects the current account balance; and iii) the positive impact of the 
budget balance on the current account balance is higher in the cases of non-Eurozone countries, 
high budget deficit countries, and low exports countries, whereas it is lower in the cases of 
Eurozone countries, low budget deficit countries, and high exports countries.  
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 Over the last decades, high and persistent budget and external deficits have occurred in 
several developed countries. For example, in countries such as the United States, Germany, and 
Sweden, the growth of the budget deficits in the 1980s and 1990s was accompanied by a real 
appreciation of the domestic currency, and, subsequently, a deterioration in the current account 
(Piersanti, 2000). 
There is a substantial body of empirical work on the relationship between budget deficits 
and external deficits, albeit with different results. Indeed, the diversity of results in terms of 
empirical evidence results from the differences in the econometric techniques used, as well as 
the specifications of the models, the measurement of the data, and the samples used (Algieri, 
2013). Accordingly, researchers have been unable to solve this issue and the impact of budget 
deficits on current account deficits remains inconclusive. 
Some studies suggest that the deterioration of the external accounts is significantly 
explained by the occurrence of high budget deficits. This relationship is known as “twin 
deficits” and was initially studied for the United States, when the country experienced 
significant budget deficits and external deficits in the 1980s, and it was then extensively 
researched for many other countries. It has been proved that the budget deficit and the external 
deficit are related in some way – which gave rise to the concept of twin deficits (Rosenweig 
and Tallman, 1993).  
Although extensively studied over the last decades, the possible link between both 
external accounts deficits and budget deficits, from the perspective of twin deficits, is a subject 
of controversy among researchers, especially bearing in mind that there is no consensus 
regarding whether the budget deficit causes the external deficit, or the opposite. Another view, 
which is called the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (Barro, 1974; 1989), suggests that both 
deficits are not causally linked. In turn, Summers (1988) supports the Current Account 
Targeting Hypothesis: whereby the causality between the budget deficit and the external deficit 
will be from the latter to the former – that is to say, in the opposite direction. Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) find a high correlation between savings and investment, which translates into 
bi-directional causality between the budget balance and the current account balance, with both 
variables moving together. More recently, Kim and Roubini (2008) advance that “twin 
divergence” is more likely than “twin deficits”, when they are considered endogenous 
movements of the budget deficit and the current account deficit. 
This study considers a set of explanatory and control variables which are commonly 
listed in the literature as being determinants of the current account balance (macroeconomic, 
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demographics, financial, macroeconomic stability, institutional, and the role of fiscal rules) and 
adds dummy variables which are designed to capture the effect of crises in the current account 
balance. Empirical works such as those of Chinn and Prasad (2003), Cheung et al. (2013), Das 
(2016), Badinger et al. (2017) and Altayligil and Çetrez (2020) also follow this line.  
We analyse the existence of a causal relationship between the general government 
balance and the current external balance for 28 European Union countries, between 1996 and 
2019. The empirical analysis carried out uses two complementary econometric methodologies: 
i) a static panel framework, based on fixed effects estimator; and ii) a dynamic panel 
framework, using a GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) system model. The use of both 
methodologies is justified by two reasons. On the one hand, a fixed effects estimator enables us 
to capture relevant time-invariant unobservable country-specific characteristics of the current 
account balance. On the other hand, a System GMM model enables the measurement of the 
persistence and endogeneity of the variables under study.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical framework. Section 
3 reviews the related literature and Section 4 presents the analytical methodology for the 
analysis. Section 5 discusses the empirical results obtained. Finally, Section 6 presents the 
conclusions of the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
The link between the current account balance (CA) and the government budget balance 
(GB) stems from the standard macro identity: 
 𝑌  𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑋 − 𝑀  (1) 
where Y is domestic output, C is private consumption expenditure, I is private investment, G is 
government expenditure, X are exports of goods and services, and M are imports of goods and 
services. Using the definition of national income (R) and net factor income (NFI) from the rest 
of the world we have 
 𝑅   𝑌 + 𝑁𝐹𝐼.  (2) 
Therefore, disposable income (𝑅 − 𝑇) is consumed or saved: 
 𝑅   𝐶 + 𝑆 + 𝑇  (3) 
where 𝑆 denotes private saving and T taxes and the CA is the sum of the trade balance (𝑋 − 𝑀) 
and NFI: 
 𝐶𝐴(𝑋 − 𝑀) + 𝑁𝐹𝐼.  (4) 
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From the previous relationships, the 𝐶𝐴 is defined as the sum of net private saving (net 
lending position of the private sector) and net public saving, the general government balance, 
(𝐺𝐵 = 𝑇 − 𝐺): 
 𝐶𝐴(𝑆 − 𝐼) + (𝑇 − 𝐺).  (5) 
Hence, fiscal shocks could drive the current account in the same direction. In particular, 
a government budget deficit (T – G < 0) would imply a current account deficit (CA < 0). 
Naturally, this argument holds when the government budget is not fully financed by domestic 
private saving and needs to be financed by foreign capital inflows. However, a budget deficit 
can lead to an increase in the net lending position of the private sector to such an extent that 
there is no effect on the current account balance – or the latter may even move towards an 
opposite direction and turn positive, resulting in a “twin divergence” (see also Afonso et al., 
2018).  
 
3. Related Literature 
3.1. Theoretical explanations  
The literature advances five perspectives to explain the relationship between the budget 
deficit and the external deficit, namely: (i) the Twin Deficit Hypothesis; (ii) the Ricardian 
Equivalence Hypothesis; (iii) the Current Account Targeting Hypothesis; (iv) the feedback 
linkage; and (v) the Twin Divergence Hypothesis. 1 
(i) The Twin Deficit Hypothesis 
The Twin Deficit Hypothesis defends that the budget deficit tends to result in a current 
account deficit. This relationship can be explained in the framework of two perspectives: the 
Mundell-Fleming Model (Mundell, 1960; Fleming, 1962) and the Keynesian Absorption 
Theory. 
From the first perspective, in an economy with a flexible exchange regime, the growth 
of budget deficit leads to higher domestic real interest rates, which in turn attract foreign capital 
flows and result in an appreciation of exchange rates. A stronger national currency reduces net 
exports (as it makes exports less attractive and increases the attractiveness of imports) and 
translates into a loss of the economy's external competitiveness, which in turn creates a current 
account deficit. In a fixed exchange rate regime, an increase in budget deficit results in an 
increase in income and prices, which consequently leads to a real appreciation of the currency, 
which it turn negatively affects the current account balance. Although transmission mechanisms 
                                                          
1 Abbas et al. (2011) review the related literature. 
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differ for fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, the widening budget deficit aggravates the 
current account deficit. 
The second perspective suggests that an increasing budget deficit can cause upward 
pressure on domestic absorption, which results in increased domestic spending, and thus 
contributes to increased imports, which in turn cause a deterioration in the current account 
balance. These effects will be more relevant depending on how much larger is the degree of 
openness of the economy and also the scale of the adjustment via transfer net taxes. 
From both perspectives, an increase in the budget deficit and consequently an increase 
in aggregate demand and real interest rates aggravates the current account deficit (or can 
detrimentally affect its surplus). 
(ii) The Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis 
According to the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (Barro, 1974; 1989), the budget 
deficit and the external deficit are unrelated, as budget changes induce an intertemporal 
reallocation of savings (when intertemporal substitution occurs between taxes and budget 
deficits), whereas the intertemporal fiscal constraints of private agents, the real interest rate, 
investment, and the current account balance all remain unchanged. Accordingly, budget deficits 
do not result in changes in interest and exchange rates and consequently the effects on the 
current account are null. Ricciuti (2003) argues that the reduction of current taxes does not 
affect national savings in cases when public spending remains constant and there are no 
restrictions on indebtedness.  
Under the assumption of the rationality of economic agents, it is understood that these 
agents anticipate the fact that an expansionary fiscal policy in a given period will result in a 
future increase in the tax burden. Therefore, in order to support future tax increases, such agents 
reduce their consumption level and increase their current savings by the same amount as the 
budget deficit increase. Higher budget deficits only implicate higher future taxes and thus 
current tax cuts result in future tax increases and their impact on the economy is null.  
Finally, according to this theoretical perspective, there is no causal relationship between 
the budget deficit and the external deficit. 
(iii) the Current Account Targeting Hypothesis 
An inverse relationship could also exist which moves in the direction of the current 
account deficit to the budget deficit. The underlying idea is that the external position of an 
economy can deteriorate on account of factors which are exogenous to its fiscal position. In this 
scenario, a budget deficit can respond to this deterioration and adjust to stabilise the economy. 
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Adjustment can be made by using automatic stabilisers and/or discretionary fiscal policies. This 
requires considerable foreign capital inflows and the ability of the Government to borrow at a 
relatively low interest rate. 
Summers (1988) referred to this inverse relationship as “Current Account Targeting”. 
This phenomenon results from the fact that the deterioration of the current account balance 
leads to a lower growth pattern and consequently to an increase in the budget deficit. This is 
justified as, on the one hand, the decrease in economic activity resulting from high current 
account deficits increases public spending and also reduces tax revenues. On the other hand, 
governments can use fiscal stimulus to mitigate the harmful economic and financial effects of 
high trade imbalances. External adjustment can thus be carried out through fiscal policy, which 
responds to external sector conditions. In this context, there is an inverse and positive causality 
current account deficit/ budget deficit. 
(iv) The feedback linkage 
According to Feldstein and Horioka (1980), savings and investment are highly 
correlated and thus this linkage translates into bi-directional causality between the budget 
balance and the current account balance, with both moving together (that is to say, causality 
between variables operates in both directions). The correlation between saving and investment 
can also result in the joint movement of the budget deficit and the current account deficit, which 
supports both the Twin Deficit Hypothesis and the Current Account Targeting Hypothesis.  
(v) the Twin Divergence Hypothesis 
On the other hand, Kim and Roubini (2008) assess the topic of the existence of 
endogenous movements of the budget deficit and the current account deficit. They suggest that 
“twin divergence” is also likely, in other words, the current account deficit can improve when 
the budget deficit worsens. This result is attributed to two factors: i) a partial Ricardian 
movement of private savings (increase in private savings); and ii) a crowding out effect on 
investment (decline in investment) – both of which are caused by an increase of the real interest 
rate, resulting from the implementation of an expansionary fiscal policy. A nominal exchange 
rate depreciation in a context of nominal rigidity translates into short-term real exchange rate 
depreciation. In cases when both balances are affected by a shock in output and/or productivity, 
“twin divergence” will be more likely. A similar but weaker result occurs when considering 





3.2. Empirical Evidence 
The empirical literature on the relation between the budget deficit and the external 
deficit presents different results regarding the existence of causality between both types of 
deficits and the direction of causality. Abell (1990), Rosenweig and Tallman (1993), 
Vamvoukas (1999), Piersanti (2000), Salvatore (2006), Beetsma et al. (2008), Daly and Siddiki 
(2009), Forte and Magazzino (2013), Trachanas and Katrakilidis (2013) and Afonso et al., 
(2018) all provide empirical support for the Twin Deficit Hypothesis, i.e., that the budget deficit 
causes the external deficit. On the contrary, there is no causal relationship between deficits in 
Algieri (2013), which validates the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis. In turn, the Current 
Account Targeting Hypothesis has empirical support in Kalou and Paleologou (2012) and 
Nikiforos et al. (2015), as the causality direction in reverse, i.e., the external deficit aggravates 
the budget deficit. The existence of bi-directional causality is found in Darrat (1998). Finally, 
in Khalid and Guan (1999), Kouassi et al. (2004), Baharumshah et al. (2006), Rault and Afonso 
(2009) and Afonso et al. (2013), where the authors obtain mixed empirical evidence regarding 
the existence and direction of causality between both deficits, with the occurrence of 
unidirectional and bi-directional causality between the budget deficit and the external deficit. 
Table 1 presents a synthesis of the above-mentioned papers. 
 
Table 1: Synthesis of Empirical Literature Review 
Reference Sample Conclusion 
Darrat (1988) United States, 
1960-1984 (quarterly data) 
Bi-directional causality 
Abell (1990) United States, 





1961-1989 (quarterly data) 
TDH  
Khalid and Guan 
(1999) 
Developed countries (United States, United 
Kingdom, France, Canada and Australia), 
1950-1994. Developing countries (India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt and Mexico), 
1955-1993 
TDH (The United States, France, Egypt and 
Mexico); Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (The 
United Kingdom and Australia); Current Account 
Targeting Hypothesis (Indonesia and Pakistan); 
Bi-directional causality (Canada and India) 
Vamvoukas (1999) Greece, 1948-1994 TDH  
Piersanti (2000) OECD countries (excluding Turkey, 
Switzerland, Portugal, Iceland, Belgium and 
others), 1970-1997 
TDH  
Kouassi et al. (2004) 20 developed countries and developing 
countries, 1969-1998 
TDH (Italy and Israel); REH  (developed and 
developing countries); CATH  (Korea); Bi-
directional causality (Thailand) 
Baharumshah et al. 
(2006) 
Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand: 
1976-2000 (quarterly data);  
Malaysia: 1976Q1-1998Q2 
TDH (Thailand); CATH  (Indonesia); Bi-
directional causality (Philippines and Malaysia) 
Salvatore (2006) G7 countries (United States, Japan, 
Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy 
and Canada), 1973-2005 
TDH  





Daly and Siddiki 
(2009) 
23 OECD countries, 
1960-2000 
TDH  
Rault and Afonso 
(2009) 
European Union and OECD countries, 
1970-2007 
Depending on the country: TDH; REH; CATH  





Afonso et al. (2013) European Union and OECD countries, 
1970-2007 
Depending on the country: TDH; REH; CATH  
Algieri (2013) Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, 
1980Q2-2012Q2 (quarterly data) 
REH  
Forte and Magazzino 
(2013) 





Italy: 1971-2009; Portugal: 1977-2009; 
Ireland, Greece and Spain: 1975-2009 
TDH  
Nikiforos et al. (2015) Greece, 
1980-2010 (quarterly data) 
CATH  
Afonso et al. (2018) 65 countries over the period 1985-2015. The TDH is confirmed. The impact of the budget 
balance on the current account balance is increased 
when fiscal rules are considered. 




Two econometric methodologies using panel data are implemented to determine the 
impact of the budget deficit on the current account deficit. The first is a static panel estimation 
that uses a fixed effects (FE) estimator. FE estimation enables one to capture relevant time-
invariant unobservable country-specific characteristics for the determination of the current 
account balance but are omitted by other models, such as Pooled OLS or Random Effects. The 
second methodology is a dynamic estimation which is based on the GMM system. This method 
is more suitable in the presence of both endogeneity and the persistence of explanatory and 
dependent variables, as other panel data models do not produce consistent estimates.  
 The baseline FE specification to estimate is as follows: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + Ω𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  (6) 
where CAi,t is the CA-to-GDP ratio of country i (i = 1, …, n) in year t (t = 1, …, T); GBi,t is the 
general government balance-to-GDP of country i in year t; xi,t is a set of control variables 
(determinants of saving and investment and other relevant variables); θi is the cross-section 
fixed effect; Ωt is the period fixed effect; and ui,t is the random disturbance term of country i in 
year t.  
 In addition, we also resort to the System GMM approach – an augmented version of 
GMM presented by Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The original equations in levels are added to the system because lagged levels are often poor 
instruments for first differences, as occurred in Arellano and Bond first difference model. 
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Additional moment conditions could increase efficiency. In these equations, predetermined and 
endogenous variables in levels are instrumented with their lagged first differences.  
The baseline GMM specification to estimate is as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡                        (7)                                       
where CAi,t is the CA-to-GDP ratio of country i in year t; CAi,t-1 is the CA-to-GDP ratio of 
country i in year t lagged one period; GBi,t is the general government balance-to-GDP of country 
i in year t; xi,t is a set of control variables (determinants of saving and investment and other 
relevant variables); δi is the cross-section fixed effect; t is the period fixed effect; and 𝜑i,t is the 
random disturbance term of country i in year t.  
The Twin Deficit Hypothesis suggests that the coefficients 𝛼1 and 𝛽2 from Equations 
(6) and (7), respectively, have a positive and significant sign. In contrast, the Ricardian 
Equivalence Hypothesis advances that these coefficients are insignificant.  
 
5. Empirical assessment 
5.1. Data 
The sample in our paper includes yearly data for 28 European Union countries, namely: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, between 1996 and 2019.  
According to AMECO data, the average weights of budget balance as a percentage of 
GDP between 1995 and 2019 in Portugal and Greece were -4.7% and -6.5%, respectively. As 
for the average weights of current external balance as a percentage of GDP during this period, 
these values attained -5.6% and -6.9%, respectively. Among all the countries of the European 
Union, Portugal and Greece registered the highest budgetary and current deficits. In contrast, 
countries such as Denmark and Sweden registered balanced public accounts and had external 
surpluses of 4.4% of GDP. Accordingly, based on this statistical information, our research 
question is whether there is a positive relationship between the budgetary and external (or 
current account) balances for the countries of the European Union,.  
 The dependent variable under analysis is the current account balance as a percentage of 
GDP (CA). The following explanatory variables are used in the model: (i) macroeconomic 
determinants: general government balance as a percentage of GDP (GB), real effective 
exchange rate (REER), real GDP growth rate per capita (GR), total factor productivity (TFP), 
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trade openness (TO), and long-term real interest rate (R); (ii) demographics determinants: old-
age dependency ratio (OLDD) and youth dependency ratio (YOUNGD); (iii) one financial 
determinant: weight of private sector credit flow consolidated as a percentage of GDP (CRED); 
(iv) one macroeconomic stability determinant: inflation rate (INF); (v) one institutional 
determinant: government effectiveness index (GOV); and (vi) one fiscal rules index (FR).2 The 
dummy variables employed are: dummy for Eurozone crisis (DEUROZONECRISIS), dummy 
for sovereign crisis (DSOVEREIGN), dummy for banking crisis occurrence (DBANKINGO), 
and a dummy for CA values (DCA).  
We provide a detail description of the variables in the Appendix (Tables A1-A3) and 
also of the data sources, the summary statistics, and the correlation matrix between the variables 
used in the research. 
Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) refer that many panel datasets show cross-sectional 
dependence and that this can be related with the presence of common shocks and unobservable 
components. Panel first-generation unit root tests do not consider the cross-sectional 
dependency of the variables and fail in their presence. Accordingly, we implement several 
cross-sectional dependence tests, especially the Pesaran test (2004), which enables us to 
confirm the cross-sectional dependence of the variables. Next, we performed the panel second-




5.2.1. Baseline Results 
5.2.1.1. Static panel estimates 
According to the results reported in Table 2, improvements in the budget balance have 
a positive and statistically significant impact on the current account balance, which is in line 
with other studies. In particular, Specification (6) shows that an increase in the budget balance 
of one pp results in an increase in the current account balance of 0.318 pp, which validates the 
Twin Deficits Hypothesis. The crowding-out effect of the behaviour of private agents and 
private saving in European Union countries provides a significant, albeit not full Ricardian 
effect on variations in public saving. 
 
                                                          
2 Similar to Forte and Magazzino (2013), we include total factor productivity as an explanatory variable of the 
current account balance.  
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Estimates (28 countries) 
Regressors/Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GB 0.551*** 0.390*** 0.439*** 0.428*** 0.365*** 0.318*** 
 (0.115) (0.112) (0.115) (0.112) (0.118) (0.107) 
REER -0.048 -0.010 -0.009 0.006 -0.014 -0.025 
 (0.048) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.038) 
GR -1.331*** -0.830*** -0.628*** -0.613*** -0.604*** -0.564*** 
 (0.242) (0.209) (0.191) (0.179) (0.161) (0.160) 
TFP 1.578*** 1.132*** 0.911*** 0.855*** 0.858*** 0.801*** 
 (0.281) (0.237) (0.231) (0.219) (0.206) (0.206) 
TO 0.033 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 
 (0.036) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) 
R 0.243*** 0.502*** 0.466*** 0.407*** 0.433*** 0.453*** 
 (0.082) (0.102) (0.109) (0.105) (0.084) (0.089) 
OLDD  0.729*** 0.607** 0.532* 0.659** 0.494* 
  (0.227) (0.260) (0.262) (0.259) (0.276) 
YOUNGD  0.138 0.091 0.120 0.103 0.119 
  (0.206) (0.227) (0.230) (0.231) (0.237) 
CRED   -0.103 -0.096 -0.089 -0.085 
   (0.064) (0.061) (0.062) (0.059) 
INF    -0.282** -0.221 -0.136 
    (0.132) (0.135) (0.136) 
GOV     0.042*** 0.044*** 
     (0.012) (0.012) 
FR      0.009** 
      (0.004) 
Observations 592 566 560 560 504 504 
R-squared 0.315 0.441 0.489 0.500 0.545 0.558 
Period 1996-2019 1996-2018 1996-2018 1996-2018 1996-2018 1996-2018 
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is the current account balance as a percentage of GDP; (b) Robust standard 
errors in parentheses; (c) Constant term estimated, but omitted for reasons of parsimony; (d) *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
The mean estimate of the general government balance as a percentage of GDP for our 
sample of 28 European Union countries presented in Table 2 is similar to the mean estimate of 
0.37 pp obtained by Forte and Magazzino (2013) for 33 European countries between 1970 and 
2010, using a dynamic panel model. Chinn and Prasad (2003) had previously found a mean 
estimate of 0.34 pp for a sample of industrial countries, using a cross section analysis during 
the period of 1971-1995. Nevertheless, our estimate is higher than that of 0.194 pp reported in 
Badinger et al. (2017) for industrial countries (see Table 3 of their paper).  
The estimate of the general government balance as a percentage of GDP remains highly 
significant from among the various macroeconomic determinants of the current account balance 
which are considered in the different specifications – although its value decreases when new 
determinants are added. Real GDP growth per capita, total factor productivity, long-term real 
interest rate, and the government effectiveness index all have the expected signs and are highly 
significant. Real effective exchange rate, youth dependency ratio, and the weight of private 
sector credit flow as a percentage of GDP are all statistically insignificant, despite having the 
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expected signs. Old-age dependency ratio and the fiscal rules index both have a positive and 
significant impact on the current account balance. On the other hand, inflation rate has a 
negative sign and is only significant at the 5% level in Specification (4). Trade openness is 
insignificant.  
 
Table 3: Fixed Effects Estimates with dummy variables (28 countries) 
Regressors/Specification (7) (8) (9) 
GB 0.305** 0.280** 0.196* 
 (0.112) (0.110) (0.102) 
REER -0.025 -0.026 -0.007 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
GR -0.588*** -0.541*** -0.614*** 
 (0.161) (0.148) (0.169) 
TFP 0.846*** 0.743*** 0.827*** 
 (0.210) (0.189) (0.216) 
TO -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) 
R 0.454*** 0.489*** 0.424*** 
 (0.088) (0.072) (0.097) 
OLDD 0.500* 0.516* 0.463* 
 (0.277) (0.286) (0.266) 
YOUNGD 0.089 0.121 0.147 
 (0.243) (0.232) (0.229) 
CRED -0.085 -0.082 -0.082 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.054) 
INF -0.134 -0.111 -0.125 
 (0.136) (0.134) (0.140) 
GOV 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
FR 0.009** 0.009** 0.008* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
DEUROZONECRISIS -0.008   
 (0.005)   
DSOVEREIGN  -0.035  
  (0.025)  
DBANKINGO  -0.006  
  (0.006)  
DCA*GB   0.382*** 
   (0.100) 
Observations 504 478 504 
R-squared 0.559 0.551 0.584 
Period 1996-2018 1996-2017 1996-2018 
Notes: (a) Dependent variable is the current account balance as a percentage of GDP; (b) Robust standard errors 
in parentheses; (c) Constant term estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony; (d) *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 3 shows that the dummy variable which identifies the year in which the Eurozone 
crisis broke out – 2010 – has a negative, but insignificant effect on the current account balance 
of European Union countries (Specification (7)). In turn, Specification (8) includes two dummy 
variables: one which identifies the year when a sovereign debt crisis began, and the other the 
years in which a banking crisis occurred. The signs of the dummies are insignificant, albeit 
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negative. Finally, Specification (9) considers the interaction effect of the budget balance with a 
dummy variable (DCA) which takes the value of 1 if the weight of the current account balance 
in GDP is outside the limits provided for in the Excessive Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure (MIP) – that is to say, if it is outside the range of -4 to 6% of GDP. If the weight of 
the current account balance in GDP is between -4 and 6% of GDP, then the change in the budget 
balance by 1 pp translates into the variation in the same direction of the current account balance 
by around 0.2 pp. Conversely, if the weight of the current account balance exceeds the expected 
limits, then the impact is greater, i.e., the change in the budget balance by 1 pp translates into a 
variation in the same direction of the current account balance by around 0.6 pp. It thus appears 
that the effect of the budgetary balance on the current account balance seems to be amplified in 
the presence of an excessive imbalance in the external accounts. 
 
5.2.1.2. Dynamic panel estimates 
The System GMM estimates presented in Table 4 show that the first lag of current 
account balance has a positive signal on the current account balance, which illustrates the 
persistence of this variable. Real GDP growth per capita, total factor productivity, trade 
openness, long-term real interest rate, old-age dependency ratio, the government effectiveness 
index, and the fiscal rules index all have the expected signs and all are significant. Real effective 
exchange rate and the weight of private sector credit flow as a percentage of GDP have the 
expected signs, although they are both statistically insignificant. Youth dependency ratio 
becomes insignificant after the inclusion of the government effectiveness index (Specification 
5) and the inflation rate is non-significant. In Specifications (1) to (5), the effect of budget 
balance on the current account balance is positive and significant, despite the fact that the value 
of the estimate declines as additional explanatory variables are introduced. In the case of 
Specification (6), the positive effect of budget balance on current account balance becomes 
insignificant after the inclusion of the fiscal rules index (FR) as an explanatory variable. This 
latter result implies that when the presence of fiscal rules is considered, the decline in public 
saving due to the widening of the budget deficit is offset by an equal increase in private saving. 
In this context, national saving and the current account balance remain unchanged and 
accordingly the effect of fiscal policy on external accounts is neutralised. In can thus be seen 






Table 4: System GMM Estimates (28 countries) 
Regressors/Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CAi,t-1 0.624*** 0.523*** 0.484*** 0.483*** 0.453*** 0.454*** 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.072) (0.067) (0.061) (0.056) 
GBi,t 0.264*** 0.159*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.132** 0.093 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.053) (0.052) (0.058) (0.057) 
REERi,t -0.014 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 -0.025 -0.033 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.034) (0.037) 
GRi,t -0.934*** -0.620*** -0.517*** -0.520*** -0.381*** -0.380*** 
 (0.241) (0.168) (0.130) (0.129) (0.137) (0.140) 
TFPi,t 0.884** 0.566*** 0.477** 0.479** 0.408** 0.407** 
 (0.371) (0.216) (0.192) (0.194) (0.199) (0.202) 
TOi,t 0.010* 0.013** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013** 0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Ri,t 0.157* 0.348*** 0.344*** 0.344*** 0.453*** 0.463*** 
 (0.083) (0.080) (0.093) (0.096) (0.094) (0.097) 
OLDDi,t  0.571*** 0.526*** 0.528*** 0.613*** 0.421*** 
  (0.120) (0.123) (0.130) (0.127) (0.134) 
YOUNGDi,t  0.234** 0.211** 0.211** 0.201 0.158 
  (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.123) (0.108) 
CREDi,t   -0.048 -0.048 -0.037 -0.033 
   (0.041) (0.041) (0.035) (0.033) 
INFi,t    -0.000 0.013 0.098 
    (0.089) (0.101) (0.131) 
GOVi,t     0.031*** 0.034*** 
     (0.008) (0.008) 
FRi,t      0.008** 
      (0.004) 
Observations 592 566 560 560 504 504 
Period 1996-2019 1996-2018 1996-2018 1996-2018 1996-2018 1996-2018 
Notes: (a) Dependent variable is the current account balance as a percentage of GDP; (b) First-step estimates 
reported; (c) Robust standard errors in parentheses; (d) Constant term estimated but omitted for reasons of 
parsimony; (e) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Regressions (7) and (8) of Table 5 consider the inclusion of the three crisis dummy 
variables – DEUROZONECRISIS, DSOVEREIGN and DBANKINGO. The effect of the 
Eurozone crisis on the current account balance is negative and significant at 5% level and the 
effect of sovereign debt crises is negative and significant at 10% level, with the effect of bank 
debt crises being negative and highly significant. Additionally, Regression (9) includes an 
interaction term between the budget balance and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the weight of the current account balance in GDP is outside the limits provided for in the MIP. 
The interaction term is positive and highly significant and its estimate highlights the fact that if 
the weight of the current account in GDP exceeds the limits of the MIP, then the variation of 
the budget balance of 1 pp results in a variation of 0.2 pp in the current account balance. For all 
three regressions, the impact of the budget balance on the current account balance is not 




Table 5: System GMM Estimates with dummy variables (28 countries) 
Regressors/Specification (7) (8) (9) 
CAi,t-1 0.456*** 0.440*** 0.419*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) 
GBi,t 0.074 0.032 0.045 
 (0.059) (0.055) (0.065) 
REERi,t -0.031 -0.036 -0.030 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) 
GRi,t -0.415*** -0.340** -0.401*** 
 (0.140) (0.142) (0.145) 
TFPi,t 0.477** 0.334* 0.420** 
 (0.194) (0.185) (0.209) 
TOi,t 0.011** 0.009* 0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ri,t 0.465*** 0.498*** 0.461*** 
 (0.097) (0.086) (0.103) 
OLDDi,t 0.419*** 0.469*** 0.440*** 
 (0.133) (0.145) (0.136) 
YOUNGDi,t 0.114 0.168 0.194* 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.104) 
CREDi,t -0.033 -0.033 -0.037 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
INFi,t 0.102 0.130 0.093 
 (0.130) (0.118) (0.131) 
GOVi,t 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
FRi,t 0.008* 0.008* 0.007* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
DEUROZONECRISISi,t -0.010**   
 (0.005)   
DSOVEREIGNi,t  -0.018*  
  (0.010)  
DBANKINGOi,t  -0.011***  
  (0.004)  
DCAi,t*GBi,t   0.209*** 
   (0.079) 
Observations 504 478 504 
Period 1996-2018 1996-2017 1996-2018 
Notes: (a) Dependent variable is the current account balance as a percentage of GDP; (b) First-step estimates 
reported; (c) Robust standard errors in parentheses; (d) Constant term estimated but omitted for reasons of 
parsimony; (e) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
5.2.2. Robustness checks  
To test the robustness of the empirical results found using the GMM system, we carried 
out four sensitivity analysis. The first sensitivity analysis examines whether the impact of the 
budget balance on the current external balance is different before and after the Eurozone crisis 
in 2010. The second sensitivity analysis examines whether there is a difference in this effect 
between those countries that constitute the Eurozone, and those that do not.3 The third 
                                                          
3 Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak, Slovenia, and Spain; non-Eurozone countries: 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
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sensitivity analysis tests whether for high budget deficit countries (countries with an average 
budget deficit greater than 3% of GDP for the period) the impact of the balance of public 
accounts on the balance of external accounts is different from the impact in the case of low 
budget deficit countries (countries with a budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP).4 The fourth 
sensitivity analysis investigates whether the effect of the budget balance on the current account 
balance is similar for high exports countries (countries whose share of exports in GDP is higher 
than the average of the European Union countries) when compared with low exports countries 
(countries whose share of exports in GDP is lower than the European Union mean).5 Tables 6 
and 7 report the estimates.  
In all the specifications, the first lag of the current account balance has a positive signal 
and is highly significant in the current account balance. For just after 2010, the budget balance 
positively affects the current account balance, and in the case of non-Eurozone countries,  high 
budget deficit countries, and low exports countries, the positive impact of the budget balance 
on the current account balance is higher than in the cases of Eurozone countries, low budget 
deficit countries, and high exports countries. The real effective exchange rate exhibits statistical 
significance for both high budget deficits countries and for low exports countries. Real GDP 
growth per capita and total factor productivity are not significant for non-Eurozone countries, 
high budget deficit countries, and low exports countries. The trade openness is positive and 
significant before 2010 and in high budget deficit countries. The weight of private sector credit 
flow as a percentage of GDP is highly significant for non-Eurozone countries, high budget 
deficits countries and low exports countries. Inflation rate has a positive and significant signal 
for both Eurozone countries and low budget deficit countries. The fiscal rules index is only 
significant for Eurozone countries and high budget deficit countries. After 2010, trade 
openness, long-term real interest rate, and government effectiveness index are all non-
significant, with youth dependency ratio being negative and significant at the 10% level. For 
low budget deficit countries, both old-age dependency ratio and youth dependency ratio are 
                                                          
4 Budget deficit (average in the period): high budget deficit countries: the Czech Republic (-3.01%), France (-
3.58%), Greece (-6.46%), Hungary (-4.78%), Italy (-3.25%), Malta (-3.44%), Poland (-3.8%), Portugal (-4.73%), 
Romania (-3.31%), Slovakia (-4.62%), Slovenia (-3.26%), Spain (-3.77%), and the United Kingdom (-3.67%); 
low budget deficit countries: Austria (-2.36%), Belgium (-2.01%), Bulgaria (-0.69%), Croatia (-2.53%), Cyprus (-
2.79%), Denmark (0.4%), Estonia (0.21%), Finland (0.35%), Germany (1.67%), Ireland (-2.8%), Latvia (-1.99%), 
Lithuania (-2.73%), Luxembourg (1.9%), the Netherlands (-1.65%), and Sweden (0.01%). 
5 Weight of exports (an European Union mean of 56.5% for 1995-2019): high exports countries: Belgium (74%), 
Czech Republic (60.9%), Estonia (69.8%), Ireland (95.6%), Cyprus (62.6%), Lithuania (56.9%), Luxembourg 
(167,9%), Hungary (70.6%), Malta (132%), Netherlands (69.6%), Slovakia (73.6%) and Slovenia (62.9%); low 
exports countries: Austria (47.8%), Bulgaria (50.3%), Croatia (38.3%), Denmark (48.4%), Finland (38.6%), 
France (27.8%), Germany (38.1%), Greece (24.4%), Italy (26.4%), Latvia (47%), Poland (37.6%), Portugal 
(32.5%), Romania (30.8%), Spain (28.3%), Sweden (43.2%) and United Kingdom (26.9%). 
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positive and significant at 5% level. Old-age dependency ratio is also significant in Eurozone 
countries and high exports countries.  
 
Table 6: I and II Sensitivity Analyses - System GMM Estimates 





Regressors/Specification  (I.1) (I.2) (II.1) (II.2) 
CAi,t-1 0.346*** 0.502*** 0.466*** 0.523*** 
 (0.071) (0.135) (0.057) (0.062) 
GBi,t -0.102 0.192* 0.124** 0.278*** 
 (0.179) (0.103) (0.059) (0.060) 
REERi,t -0.000 0.022 0.100 -0.020 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.079) (0.033) 
GRi,t -0.483** -0.671*** -0.581*** -0.080 
 (0.222) (0.239) (0.147) (0.179) 
TFPi,t 0.563** 0.926*** 0.771*** -0.064 
 (0.287) (0.298) (0.255) (0.204) 
TOi,t 0.022** 0.015 0.011** 0.018** 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.005) (0.007) 
Ri,t 0.590*** 0.126 0.507*** 0.279*** 
 (0.119) (0.102) (0.135) (0.082) 
OLDDi,t 0.321 0.094 0.312** 0.064 
 (0.319) (0.229) (0.155) (0.081) 
YOUNGDi,t 0.255 -0.294* 0.125 -0.054 
 (0.305) (0.156) (0.108) (0.062) 
CREDi,t -0.016 0.027 -0.023 -0.225*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.074) 
INFi,t 0.220 -0.077 0.273* -0.068 
 (0.176) (0.091) (0.158) (0.106) 
GOVi,t 0.052*** 0.009 0.040*** 0.019*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.007) (0.005) 
FRi,t -0.005 0.005 0.013** 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
Observations 266 210 354 150 
Number of countries 28 27 19 9 
Period 1996-2009 2010-2018 1996-2018 1996-2018 
Notes: (a) Dependent variable is the current account balance as a percentage of GDP; (b) First-step estimates 
reported; (c) Robust standard errors in parentheses; (d) Constant term estimated but omitted for reasons of 
























Regressors/Specification (III.1) (III.2) (IV.1) (IV.2) 
CAi,t-1 0.598*** 0.417*** 0.481*** 0.458*** 
 (0.034) (0.065) (0.052) (0.081) 
GBi,t 0.224*** 0.176*** 0.213*** 0.335*** 
 (0.066) (0.052) (0.058) (0.087) 
REERi,t -0.047* 0.104 0.010 -0.051* 
 (0.027) (0.096) (0.080) (0.031) 
GRi,t -0.035 -0.812*** -0.784*** -0.110 
 (0.152) (0.170) (0.147) (0.094) 
TFPi,t -0.051 1.086*** 0.937*** -0.003 
 (0.193) (0.313) (0.269) (0.096) 
TOi,t 0.007* 0.007 0.005 0.012 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) 
Ri,t 0.132*** 0.613*** 0.471*** 0.313*** 
 (0.026) (0.125) (0.160) (0.098) 
OLDDi,t 0.013 0.485** 0.521*** 0.051 
 (0.057) (0.202) (0.195) (0.100) 
YOUNGDi,t -0.146 0.287** 0.190 -0.007 
 (0.093) (0.128) (0.127) (0.115) 
CREDi,t -0.180*** -0.030 -0.027 -0.217*** 
 (0.017) (0.031) (0.034) (0.043) 
INFi,t 0.025 0.345* 0.154 0.090 
 (0.076) (0.186) (0.137) (0.127) 
GOVi,t 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.031** 0.022*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) 
FRi,t 0.005** 0.009 0.008 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Observations 239 265 212 292 
Number of countries 13 15 12 16 
Period 1996-2018 1996-2018 1996-2018 1996-2018 
Notes: (a) Dependent variable is the current account balance as a percentage of GDP; (b) First-step estimates 
reported; (c) Robust standard errors in parentheses; (d) Constant term estimated but omitted for reasons of 
parsimony; (e) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This research studies the existence of a causal relationship between the general 
government balance and the current account balance (assessed as a percentage of GDP) for 28 
European Union countries, using annual data for 1996 to 2019. The study was carried out in 
accordance with two complementary econometric methodologies: a fixed effects model and a 
System GMM model. The results obtained from the use of both methodologies imply the 
existence of causality between the general government balance and the current external balance, 
which empirically corroborates the Twin Deficit Hypothesis.  
However, in accordance with the System GMM model employed, there is no 
relationship between both variables in the presence of a fiscal rules index – which could 
partially corroborate the Equivalence Ricardian Hypothesis. On the other hand, even in the 
presence of a fiscal rules index, if the weight of the current account balance on GDP is outside 
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the reference range defined in the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure from the European 
Commission (-4 to 6% of GDP), then the effect of the budget balance on the balance of the 
current account is positive and statistically significant. This result could indicate the existence 
of asymmetry in the relationship between the budget balance and the current account balance, 
as found by Trachanas and Katrakilidis (2013). Moreover, the System GMM estimates enabled 
us to prove the negative impact of the recent Eurozone crisis, banking crises, and sovereign 
debt crises on the current account balance.  
We also carried out four sensitivity analyses. The first concludes that the general 
government balance only has a positive impact on current account balance after 2010, and that 
this coefficient is insignificant before 2010. In the other three analyses, we divide the countries 
of the European Union into three pairs: (i) Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries; (ii) high and 
low budget deficit countries; and (iii) high and low exports countries. Through the use of 
sensitivity analyses, we find that in the case of non-Eurozone countries, high budget deficit 
countries, and low exports countries, the positive impact of the budget balance on the current 
account balance is higher than in the case of Eurozone countries, low budget deficit countries, 
and high exports countries.  
 
References  
Abbas, S. M. A., J. Bouhga-Hagbe, A. Fatás, P. Mauro, R. C. Velloso (2011). “Fiscal Policy 
and the Current Account”, IMF Economic Review, Vol. 59, pp. 603–629. 
Abell, J. D. (1990). “Twin Deficits the 1980s: An Empirical Investigation”, Journal of 
Macroeconomics, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 81-96. 
Afonso, A., C. Rault and C. Estay (2013). “Budgetary and external imbalances relationship: a 
panel data diagnostic”, Journal of Quantitative Economics, Vol. 11, Issues 1-2, pp. 84-
110. 
Afonso, A., F. Huart, J. T. Jalles and P. Stanek (2018). “Twin Deficits Revisited: a role for 
fiscal institutions?”, REM Working Paper 031-2018. 
Algieri, B. (2013). “An empirical analysis of the nexus between external balance and 
Government budget balance: The case of the GIIPS countries”, Economic Systems, Vol. 
37, Issue 2, pp. 233-253. 
Altayligil. Y. B. and M. Çetrez (2020). “Macroeconomic, institutional and financial 
determinants of current account balances: a panel data assessment”, Journal of Economic 
Structures, Vol. 9, No. 49.   
20 
 
Arellano, M. and O. Bover (1995). “Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of 
error-components models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68, Issue 1, pp. 29-51.  
Badinger, H., A. F. Clairfontaine and W. H. Reuter (2017). “Fiscal Rules and Twin Deficits: 
The Link between Fiscal and External Balances”, The World Economy, Vol. 40, Issue 1, 
pp. 21-35.  
Baharumshah, A., E. Lau and A. M. Khalid (2006). “Testing twin deficits hypothesis using 
VARs and variance decomposition”, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Vol. 11, Issue 
3, pp. 331-354. 
Barro, R. J. (1974). “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
82, Issue 6, pp. 1095-1117. 
Barro, R. J. (1989). “The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits”, Journal of Economic 
Perspetives, Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp. 37-54. 
Blundell. R. and S. Bond (1998). “Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel 
data models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87, Issue 1, pp. 115-143.  
Beetsma, R., M. Giuliodori and F. Klaassen (2008). “The effects of public spending on trade 
balances and budget deficits in the European Union”, Journal of the European Economic 
Association, Vol. 6, Issues 2-3, pp. 414-423. 
Cheung, C., D. Furceri and E. Rusticelli (2013). “Structural and Cyclical Factors behind Current 
Account Balances”, Review of International Economics, Vol. 21, Issue 5, pp. 923-944.  
Chinn, M. D. and E. S. Prasad (2003). “Medium-term determinants of current accounts in 
industrial and developing countries: an empirical exploration”, Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 59, Issue 1, pp. 47-76.  
Daly, V. and J. U. Siddiki (2009). “The twin deficits in OECD countries: cointegration analysis 
with regime shifts”, Applied Economic Letters, Vol. 16, Issue 11, pp. 1155-1164. 
Darrat, A. (1988). “Have Large Budget Deficits Caused Rising Trade Deficits?”, Southern 
Economic Journal, Vol. 54, Issue 4, pp. 879-887. 
Das, D. K. (2016). “Determinants of current account imbalance in the global economy: a 
dynamic panel analysis”, Journal of Economic Structures, Vol. 5, No. 8.  
European Commission (2016). “The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. Rationale, Process, 
Application: A Compendium”, Institutional Paper 039, November.  
Feldstein, M. and C. Horioka (1980). “Domestic Saving and International Capital Flows”, The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 90, Issue 358, pp. 314-329. 
Fleming, J. M. (1962). “Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and under Floating Exchange 
Rates”, Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund, Vol. 9, November, pp. 369-379. 
21 
 
Forte, F. and C. Magazzino (2013). “Twin Deficits in the European Countries”, International 
Advances in Economic Research, Vol, 19, Issue 3, pp. 289-310. 
Hoyos, R. E. De and V. Sarafidis (2006). “Testing for cross-sectional dependence in panel-data 
models”, The Stata Journal, Vol. 6, Issue 4, pp. 482-496.  
Kalou, S. and S. – M. Paleologou (2012). “The twin deficits hypothesis: Revisiting an EMU 
country”, Journal of Policy Modelling, Vol. 34, Issue 2, pp. 230-241. 
Khalid, A. and T. W. Guan (1999). “Causality tests of budget and current account deficits: 
Cross-country comparisons”, Empirical Economics, Vol. 24, Issue 3, pp. 389-402. 
Kim, S. and N. Roubini (2008). “Twin deficit or twin divergence? Fiscal policy, current 
account, and real exchange rate in the U.S.”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 
74, Issue 2, pp. 362-383. 
Kouassi, E., M. Mougoué and K. O. Kymn (2004). “Causality tests of the relationship between 
the twin deficits”, Empirical Economics, Vol. 29, Issue 3, pp. 503-525. 
Laeven, L. and F. Valencia (2018). “Systemic Banking Crises Revisited”, International 
Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper, WP/18/06, September.  
Mundell, R. A. (1960). “The Monetary Dynamics of International Adjustment under Fixed and 
Flexible Exchange Rates”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 74, May, pp. 227-257. 
Nikiforos, M., L. Carvalho and C. Schoder (2015). ““Twin deficits” in Greece: in search of 
causality”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 38, Issue 2, pp. 302-330. 
Pesaran, M. H. (2004). “General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in Panels”, 
Discussion Paper No. 1240, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), August.  
Pesaran, M. H. (2007). “A simple panel unit root test in the presence of cross‐section 
dependence”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 22, Issue 2, pp. 265-312.  
Piersanti, G. (2000). “Current account dynamics and expected budget deficits: some 
international evidence”, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 19, Issue 2, 
pp. 255-271. 
Rault, C. and A. Afonso (2009). “Bootstrap panel granger-causality between Government 
budget and external deficits for the EU”, Economics Bulletin, Vol. 29, Issue 2, pp. 1027-
1034. 
Ricciuti, R. (2003). “Assessing Ricardian equivalence”, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 17, 
Issue 1, pp. 55-78. 
Rosenweig, J. A. and E. W. Tallman (1993). “Fiscal Policy and Trade Adjustment: are the 
deficits really twins?”, Economic Inquiry, Vol. 31, Issue 4, pp. 580-594. 
22 
 
Salvatore, D. (2006). “Twin deficits in the G-7 countries and global structural imbalances”, 
Journal of Policy Modelling, Vol. 28, Issue 6, pp. 701-712. 
Summers, L. H. (1988). “Tax Policy and International Competitiveness”, International Aspects 
of Fiscal Policies, J. Frankel (ed.), Chicago University Press. 
Trachanas, E. and C. Katrakilidis (2013). “The dynamic linkages of fiscal and current account 
deficits: New evidence from five highly indebted European countries accounting for 
regime shifts and asymmetries”, Economic Modelling, Vol. 31, Issue 1, pp. 502-510. 
Vamvoukas, G. A. (1999). “The twin deficits phenomenon: evidence from Greece”, Applied 





























Table A1: Variables, definitions, and data sources 
Variable  Definition Source 
CA current account balance as a percentage of GDP AMECO 
GB general government balance as a percentage of GDP  AMECO 
REER relative variation of the real effective exchange rate index compared to 
the previous year, based on unit labour costs (2015=100) 
Authors’ calculations based on 
AMECO data 
GR real GDP growth rate per capita compared to the previous year Authors’ calculations based on World 
Bank data 
TFP total factor productivity AMECO 
TO trade openness, the sum of exports with imports measured 
as a share of GDP 
Authors’ calculations based on 
AMECO data 
R long-term real interest rate AMECO 
OLDD old-age dependency ratio OECD 
YOUNG youth dependency ratio Authors’ calculations based on OECD 
data 
CRED weight of private sector credit flow, consolidated on GDP Eurostat 
INF inflation rate World Bank 
GOV  Government Effectiveness Index Worldwide Governance Indicators 
FR Fiscal Rule Index European Commission (2018) 
DSOVEREIGN Dummy for sovereign crisis (takes 
the value of 1 in the year a sovereign crisis begins; and 0, 
otherwise) 
Laeven and Valencia (2018) 
DBANKINGO Dummy for banking crisis occurrence (takes 
the value of 1 during the years of a banking crisis; and 0, 
otherwise) 
Laeven and Valencia (2018) 
DEUROZONECRISIS Dummy for Eurozone crisis (takes 
the value of 1 in 2010; and 0, 
otherwise) 
Own definition  
DCA Dummy for values of CA (takes the value of 0 if CA is between -0.04 
and 0.06; and 1, otherwise) 
Own definition  
 
Table A2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Maximum Minimum 
CA 693 -0.012 0.057 0.115 -0.280 
GB 700 -0.025 0.035 0.069 -0.321 
REER 672 0.010 0.061 0.554 -0.370 
GR 697 0.025 0.035 0.240 -0.143 
TFP 687 0.011 0.027 0.220 -0.134 
TO 700 1.118 0.628 4.084 0.371 
R 614 0.020 0.031 0.245 -0.124 
OLDD 672 0.242 0.043 0.354 0.156 
YOUNGD 672 0.250 0.035 0.387 0.190 
CRED 688 0.074 0.106 1.467 -0.261 
INF 700 0.053 0.409 10.584 -0.045 
GOV 588 1.134 0.614 2.350 -0.570 




Table A3: Correlation matrix 
  CA GB REER GR TFP TO R OLDD YOUNGD CRED INF GOV FR 
CA 1                         
GB 0.284 1                       
REER -0.203 0.111 1                     
GR -0.230 0.275 0.042 1                   
TFP -0.084 0.135 -0.081 0.870 1                 
TO 0.157 0.222 -0.018 0.081 0.005 1               
R 0.096 -0.421 -0.295 -0.408 -0.207 -0.209 1             
OLDD 0.263 0.119 -0.074 -0.197 -0.164 -0.266 -0.134 1           
YOUNGD 0.078 0.046 -0.004 0.143 0.206 0.052 0.095 -0.459 1         
CRED -0.272 0.278 0.090 0.248 0.071 0.138 -0.222 -0.242 0.156 1       
INF 0.039 0.015 0.148 -0.160 -0.192 -0.039 -0.192 -0.061 0.032 -0.002 1     
GOV 0.495 0.259 -0.162 -0.221 -0.160 0.130 -0.035 0.003 0.389 0.087 -0.294 1   
FR 0.393 0.319 -0.053 -0.021 -0.020 0.068 -0.246 0.517 -0.202 -0.155 -0.091 0.142 1 
 
Table A4: Panel unit root test of Pesaran (2007) model, including a constant term 






Variable CIPS* p-value CIPS* p-value 
CA -2.916 0.002 -12.457 0.000 
GB -2.376 0.009 -11.363 0.000 
REER -9.273 0.000 -15.860 0.000 
GR -4.951 0.000 -11.008 0.000 
TFP -6.015 0.000 -13.010 0.000 
TO -2.012 0.022 -4.875 0.000 
R 0.312 0.623 -12.421 0.000 
OLDD -0.036 0.486 -1.089 0.138 
YOUNGD -3.823 0.000 -3.686 0.000 
CRED -3.665 0.000 -10.133 0.000 
INF -5.378 0.000 -16.494 0.000 
GOV 1.414 0.921 -7.964 0.000 
FR -1.405 0.080 -10.618 0.000 
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